Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2012

User-Generated Pornography on the Internet: Why
Victims of Porn 2.0 Need Internet Service
Providers to No Longer Be Unjustifiably
Immunized by the Communications "Decency"
Act
Jenelle Hubbard
Seton Hall Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Internet Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hubbard, Jenelle, "User-Generated Pornography on the Internet: Why Victims of Porn 2.0 Need Internet Service Providers to No
Longer Be Unjustifiably Immunized by the Communications "Decency" Act" (2012). Law School Student Scholarship. 44.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/44

Legal Issues in Online Communities
Fall 2011
Seminar Paper

USER-GENERATED PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET: WHY VICTIMS OF
PORN 2.0 NEED INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS TO NO LONGER BE
UNJUSTIFIABLY IMMUNIZED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS “DECENCY” ACT

Jenelle L. Hubbard Date Submitted: December 1, 2011

This paper is submitted to Professor Judson Jennings in partial satisfaction of the requirements of
Law & Practice in Virtual Communities. This paper is submitted in satisfaction of the Seton Hall
Law School's Advanced Writing Requirement. This paper is approved for AWR certification.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty-five to thirty years, Internet usage has increased at lightning speed. 1 In
a 1995 survey, only 14% of adults (those individuals age eighteen and over) reported that they
had ever used a computer to connect to the Internet on a regular basis.2 In stark comparison, a
recent survey reported that as of May 2011, 78% of adults (those individuals age eighteen and
over) now use the Internet regularly.3 When considering only those individuals who live in highincome households (those households making $75,000 or more a year), the number of adults
using the Internet regularly jumps to 96%.4
Among those adults who are now using the Internet regularly, the Internet is increasingly
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3

4

See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
Internet Adoption, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, http://www.pewinternet.org/TrendData/Internet-Adoption.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining that the 14% of adults who reported in
1995 that they had ever used a computer to connect to the Internet included those individuals who said that they
had ever used “a home, work or school computer and modem to connect to computer bulletin boards,
information services such as CompuServe or Prodigy, or computers at other locations”).
Who’s Online: Internet User Demographics, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY,
http://www.pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
Id.
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being utilized as a way to get news, shop, socialize, and network. 5 While the “Millennial
Generation” (those individuals born in 1977-1992) is still significantly more likely than older
generations to engage in several online activities, such as social networking and blogging, older
generations are making notable gains in these areas.6 For example, in recent years, the fastest rate
of growth in social networking came from the “G.I. Generation” (those individuals born before
1937).7 Between 2008 and 2010, the rate of social network site usage for the G.I. Generation
quadrupled from 4% to 16%.8 While younger Internet users remain the most active participants
in social networking services and other online activities, some Internet activities are becoming
more uniformly popular across all age groups.9 The most uniformly popular uses of the web
being email and search engines.10
Undoubtedly, the continuous development of Internet technologies and uses – including
the introduction of Web 2.0 – has contributed to the substantial growth in Internet usage over
time. “Web 2.0” is commonly used to refer to “applications that facilitate interactive information
sharing, interoperability, user-centered design, and collaboration."11 One of the significant
features of these Web 2.0 technologies is that they allow users to upload their own (“user5
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See Kristen Purcell, Search and email still top the list of most popular online activities, PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, 2 (Aug. 9, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Search-andEmail.pdf (reporting that between 2002 and 2011 there was an increase in the number of Internet users who use
the web to get news, buy products, and go on social networking sites).
See Kathryn Zickuhr, Generations 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, 2 (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Generations_and_Tech10.pdf (reporting that in
addition to use of social networking sites, “Milliennials” also surpass older generations when it comes to the use
of instant messaging, using online classifieds, listening to music, playing online games, reading blogs and
participating in virtual worlds).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2 (reporting that the Internet activities that are becoming more uniformly popular across all age groups
include email, search engine use, seeking health information, getting news, buying products, making travel
reservations or purchases, doing online banking, looking for religious information, rating products, services, or
people, making online charitable donations, and downloading podcasts).
Purcell, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that as of May 2011, “92% of online adults use search engines to find
information on the Web and . . . 92% use email”); Zickuhr, supra note 6, at 11 (reporting that as of 2010, 87%
of online adults use search engines and 94% use email).
KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 8.01 (2011), available at Lexis 1-8 ALMIOL § 8.01 (quoting
another source) (citation omitted).
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generated”) content onto the Internet for other users to see. 12 The immensely popular websites
Facebook,13 YouTube,14 and Wikipedia15 are all examples of Web 2.0 applications.16
Web 2.0 has also led to the development of more explicit websites – sometimes referred
to as “Porn 2.0”17 – where users upload pornographic materials that they have created onto the
Internet.18 Naturally, once these user-generated materials have been uploaded, they are
potentially available for anyone who logs onto the Internet to see.19 Thus, in light of the extreme
popularity of Porn 2.0 websites,20 postings on these sites can have detrimental and long-lasting
effects on a person’s reputation,21 career,22 mental health, etc., and have led to harassment and
threats of violence.23
There are a number of reasons why an individual would upload their own pornographic
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See generally Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O’REILLY MEDIA INC. (Sept. 30, 2005),
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html.
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
See Web 2.0, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
See PORNOTUBE, INC., http://PornoTube.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2011), REDTUBE, http://www.RedTube.com
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011), and YOUPORN, http://www.YouPorn.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) for examples
of Porn 2.0 websites.
See generally Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 799,
799 (2008); Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and WebPages: Creating A Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn
2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 2 (2009).
See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 8.
Alexa.com, a website that measures the popularity of websites, calculates that one of the most popular Porn 2.0
websites, YouPorn, is the eighty-second most visited site in the world, and the eighty-eighth most visited site in
the United States. See Youporn.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youporn.com (last visited
Nov. 29, 2011).
See A.G. Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves To the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 18650902 (describing how anonymous posts on an online community
forum damaged a couple’s reputation in the community, and ultimately lead to the couple’s decision to
relocate).
See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1, available at 2007
WLNR 28542997 (discussing how posts about female law students on an anonymous Internet defamation
website resulted in threats of sexual violence and possible damage to the students’ professional reputations);
Jeff Tyler, Get yourself a little online privacy, MARKETPLACE MONEY (Mar. 2, 2007),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/03/02/an_online_identity/ (interviewing an ivy league law
student who claimed that vulgar comments made about her on an online discussion board made it difficult for
her to find a job).
See Brittan Heller, Note, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of Internet Defamation, 19 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 282-83 (2007) (detailing how a well-known software programmer reacted to receiving
anonymous online threats of sexual violence by canceling her scheduled public speaking events).
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materials onto the Internet.24 Unfortunately, time and experience has demonstrated that their
intentions are not always innocent.25 These sites are sometimes intentionally used as instruments
for humiliation and revenge by jealous co-workers, scorned ex-partners, etc. For example, in
2004 when Cecilia Barnes broke up with her long-term boyfriend, he turned to the Internet for
revenge and posted fake Internet profiles in Ms. Barnes’ name, posting nude photos of Barnes
and solicitations for sexual intercourse.26 Ms. Barnes only became aware of these unauthorized
profiles and their content after she started to receive emails and phone calls from strangers
soliciting her for sex.27
Unfortunately, experiences like Ms. Barnes’ are not uncommon and as the number of
user-generated websites has grown, it has become increasingly easy for Internet users to post
pornographic materials of people who did not consent to the materials’ circulation.28 Of course,
almost every adult in America has heard of celebrities, such as Pamela Anderson, who have sex
tapes on the Internet despite the celebrity’s highly publicized efforts to suppress the videos.29
However, in the case of unauthorized Porn 2.0 postings, celebrities are in a different a position
compared to non-celebrities. For starters, celebrities generally have better financial resources to
24
25

26
27
28
29

See Bartow, supra note 18, at 813.
See id.; see, e.g., Ex girlfriend revenge!, IHATESTACEY.COM, http://www.ihatestacy.com/ (last visited on Oct.
11, 2011) (a site that purportedly allows users to view private photos of the website author’s ex-girlfriend after
the viewer refers a minimum number of people to the site); Get Revenge On Your Ex,
GETREVENGEONYOUREX, http://www.getrevengeonyourex.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (a website that
advertises to users that they can “Produce The Evidence [They] Need Or Just Humiliate [Their] Ex Like Never
Before!” by offering to digitally alter photos that a user has uploaded to create a “special photo” such as a
“photograph of [their] ex with another person, in a compromising pose, being violated or anything else [the
user] can think of!”); Revenge Pics Of You Ex, FREE-REVENGE-IDEAS.COM, http://www.free-revengeideas.com/Revenge-Pics-Of-Your-Ex.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (a website “designed” to allow users to
share photos and stories about their exes and encourages users to upload the “funniest or meanest” of these
materials).
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id.
See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 3.
See Ann W. O’Neill, Big Names Lose a Few Rounds During a Litigious Year, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, at B1,
available at 1997 WLNR 5646344 (reporting that although Pamela Anderson and her husband, Tommy Lee,
“spent an extraordinary amount of time” trying to suppress a sex tape from the couple’s honeymoon from being
released, the video was ultimately made available to subscribers to certain adult websites and would be released
in hard copy in the future).
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fund litigation.30 Additionally, from a purely economic standpoint, one can question whether
celebrities actually suffer any damage as a result of the unauthorized release of their explicit
materials.31 For example, when Paris Hilton and Kim Kardashian’s sex tapes were “leaked” to
the public, each of these celebrities not only experienced a new level of fame, but they both
reportedly cut a deal for a percentage of the proceeds.32
In comparison, a non-celebrity is unlikely to experience any benefit – commercial or
otherwise – when they become a victim of an unauthorized and explicit posting on the Internet.
However, they are very likely to experience the destructive consequences of these sites. 33 The
unfortunate reality is that for a victim of Porn 2.0, the potential for recovery is extremely limited,
and the road to any recovery at all will be challenging.34

II.

POTENTIAL RECOVERY AGAINST THE POSTING PARTY

When a person becomes the victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, they may be able
to bring suit for damages under traditional tort theories such as defamation, invasion of privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.35 Some courts have already applied these
traditional tort theories to redress economic, reputational, or privacy-based injuries arising from

30

31

32

33
34
35

See Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 895 (2006).
Id. (“[G]iven the value of publicity and the tapes themselves, one might question what harm celebrities suffer
from this type of ‘embarrassing’ disclosure.”).
See IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 12.07[8][C] (2d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw
ECOMMINTLAW (stating that the sex tape involving celebrities Kim Kardashian and Ray J was released
“amid rumors that the participants had cut a deal for a percentage of the proceeds”); McClurg, supra note 30
(“Paris Hilton reportedly cashed in on the sex tape that made her a household name.”); see also Richard
Johnson, Happy Ending, N.Y. POST, May 1, 2007, at 12, available at 2007 WLNR 8222999 (reporting that Kim
Kardashian dropped her lawsuit against Vivid Entertainment over the release of her sex tap with Ray J in
exchange for $5,000,000).
See generally sources cited supra notes 21-23.
See discussion infra Parts II and III.
See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
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conduct on the Internet.36 However, applying these theories to conduct on the Internet has posed
some challenges because cybertorts do not involve the traditional categories of injury covered by
tort law “such as automobile accidents, slip and fall mishaps, medical malpractice, or injuries
due to dangerously defective products.”37
Thus, as a threshold matter, it is prudent to recognize some of the general procedural
challenges that arise when a Porn 2.0 victim desires to bring an action in tort against his or her
primary tortfeasor due to the special context of cybertorts and the general nature of tort law. 38
For example, because tort law is created by state law,39 where a Porn 2.0 victim files suit, and
thus which state’s law applies to his/her action, will determine whether the victim can even
attempt to pursue a particular cause of action.40 Further, the law applicable to a particular suit
will also determine a Porn 2.0 victim’s burden of proof because causes of action in tort vary
among the states where they are recognized. Lastly, even where a particular cause of action is
recognized under the governing law, a Porn 2.0 victim might have difficulty naming the
appropriate defendant due to issues of online anonymity and pseudonymity.41
When an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting is made anonymously, a victim of the post may
apply to have a court “serve a subpoena duces tucum ([or] ‘John Doe subpoena’) directed to [an]
Internet service provider[] to unveil the identity of [the] anonymous [poster].”42 However,
generally speaking, “[c]ourts will not issue a subpoena duces tecum unless the ISP gives notice

36
37
38
39
40
41

42

See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, INTERNET LAW IN A NUTSHELL 143 (2009).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5 cmt. a (1977); BALLON, supra note 36, at §§ 12.02[1], 37.01.
See BALLON, supra note 32, at §§ 12.02[1], 37.01.
See id. at §§ 1.06[2], 12.02[1]; see also RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169 (discussing the difficultly of pursuing
online libel suits for anonymous website postings); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 268 (2005) (“[T]he relative anonymity the Internet fosters
makes remedies against primary malfeasors less effective than in the brick-and-mortar context.”).
RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169.
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to the anonymous speaker and an opportunity to be heard.”43 In effect, this means that a Porn 2.0
victim has to wait to see if a court will order the ISP to unveil the identity of the anonymous
poster while the court balances the rights of the anonymous poster against a Porn 2.0 victim’s
right to vindicate his or her tort rights and remedies.44 Ultimately, there is no guarantee that a
court will find the balance to tip in favor of a Porn 2.0 victim.45 In one case, the court not only
refused to issue a subpoena to compel the anonymous Internet speakers’ identities, but also
“issued a protective order noting these persons demonstrated intent to remain anonymous by
refraining from disclosing their identities with their email addresses.”46
Assuming that a Porn 2.0 victim is able to overcome these threshold challenges to
bringing an action in tort based on conduct in the Internet, they may have a cause of action for
defamation, invasion of privacy, and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The substance
of each of these tort theories, and their potential application in the Porn 2.0 context to a primary
tortfeasor – i.e., the person who first posts the explicit content on the Internet - is described in
detail below.47
A. Defamation:
Under certain circumstances, a victim of an unauthorized posting on a Porn 2.0 website
may successfully pursue a claim of defamation against the party who originally posted the
unauthorized content on the Internet.48 Particularly, this common law tort may be utilized to
redress any statements in the unauthorized posting that injured the Porn 2.0 victim’s reputation in

43
44
45

46
47
48

Id.
See id. at 169-171.
But see Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
101, 108 n.31 (2011) (“Absent specific efforts to hide their IP address, however, users can often be identified
through records kept by intermediaries.”).
See id. at 170 (discussing Anderson v. Hale, 2001 WL 503045 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
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the community.49
Defamation is defined as “the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false
statement to a third person.”50 When such statements are made in a fixed medium – such as the
Internet – they are actionable under the defamation tort of libel. 51 Libel generally requires: “[(1)]
a false and defamatory statement concerning another; [(2)] an unprivileged publication to a third
party; [(3)] fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and [(4)] either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused
by the publication.”52
Courts have recognized that certain defamatory statements are so extreme that “special
harm” i.e., “loss of something having economic or pecuniary value”53 – need not be proven by a
plaintiff.54 These extreme statements are considered “per se defamatory.”55 “An attack on the
integrity and moral character of a [plaintiff] is libelous per se."56 Additionally, courts have held
that “[f]alse statements and distorted pictures that disgrace plaintiffs or injure their careers,

49
50
51

52

53

54
55
56

RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
See Wesley Burrell, I Am He As You Are He As You Are Me: Being Able to Be Yourself, Protecting the Integrity
of Identity Online, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 705, 717 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1)
(1977) (“Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment
in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic
of written or printed words.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). But see Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Annotation, Individual
and Corporate Liability for Libel and Slander in Electronic Communications, Including E-mail, Internet and
Websites, 3 A.L.R.6TH 153 § 4 (2005) (providing that in an action for electronic defamation, some courts have
held that a plaintiff “must make a demand in writing to the party that published a defamatory statement prior to
bringing the action”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977) (“The words ‘actionable per se’ are used . . . to denote
the fact that the publication is of such a character as to make the publisher liable for defamation although no
special harm results from it, unless the defamatory matter is true or the defamer was privileged to publish it.”).
See id. at §§ 558, 569 cmt. b.
Id.
Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 1996).
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constitute defamation per se.”57 When a statement is of such a nature that it falls within one of
these “established categories of per se defamation, ‘the law presumes that damages will result,
and they need not be alleged or proven.’”58 In other words, a defamatory statement that is
actionable per se may result in liability for defamation even though the plaintiff has not suffered
any loss of economic or pecuniary value.59 Further, where a plaintiff can establish that a
defendant’s statements are defamatory per se, proof of falsity and malice will also be
presumed.60
In the context of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, this means that a victim of the posting
may be able to establish that the challenged posting was libelous per se if the content of the
posting was altered, or in any way distorted, before it was uploaded onto the internet.61 For
example, X, may have a successful libel claim against her ex-boyfriend, Y, if Y used Photoshop
(or any other photo editing program or tools) to alter a photo of X and then posted the altered
photo on the Internet. If X can establish that the altered photo attacked X’s integrity and moral
character, disgraced X, and/or injured X’s career, Y’s posting of the altered photograph may
amount to libel per se.62 As a result, a court would presume that each of the prima facie elements
of X’s libel claim exist.63 This is the result that a court found where the defendant had altered a
photograph of the plaintiff - to make it appear that the plaintiff intentionally exposed her breasts -

57

58

59
60

61
62
63

Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 87 (2009) (citing cases); see also Wilson, 558
N.W.2d at 139 (quoting Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994)) (“In addition, we have recognized
that ‘slanderous imputations affecting a person in his or her business, trade, profession, or office are also
actionable without proof of actual harm.’”).
Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 435 (N.Y.
1992)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 569 cmt. b (1977).
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 175 (Iowa 2004) (citing Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d
108, 115-16 (Iowa 1995)) (“In statements that are libelous per se, falsity, malice, and injury are presumed and
proof of these elements is not necessary.”).
Citron, supra note 57, at 87 (citing cases).
See generally sources cited supra notes 56-57.
See Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d at 175, 178.

9

and then e-mailed the picture to the plaintiff’s colleagues.64 Once the jury found that the altered
photograph of the plaintiff was libelous per se, the court acknowledged that the law conclusively
presumed the existence of damage to the plaintiff's reputation.65 Thus, the court proceeded to
allow the jury to award the plaintiff damages without requiring that she prove any actual damage
to her reputation.66
On the other hand, a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting will be less likely to
succeed on a claim of libel if they cannot establish that the content of the posting has never been
altered.67 In order for a statement to be actionable as defamation, the statement must be both
false and defamatory.68 As the commentary to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS explains:
“There can be no recovery in defamation for a statement of fact that is true, although the
statement is made for no good purpose and is inspired by ill will toward the person about whom
it is published and is made solely for the purpose of harming him.”69 Thus, no matter how
malicious the posting party’s motives were, if the content of a Porn 2.0 post has never been
altered or distorted, the post will need to have a false caption (or similar description, title, etc.) in
order for the post to satisfy the falsity element of defamation.70
In sum, because a plaintiff can only recover on a claim of defamation if the offending
statements are both false and defamatory,71 a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery on a claim of
defamation is limited. In order for a Porn 2.0 victim to have a viable defamation claim, he or she
64

65
66
67
68

69

70
71

Id. at 169-70, 178 (upholding the district court’s finding of libel per se after finding substantial evidence existed
to support the jury’s finding).
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. a (1977) (“To create liability for defamation there must be
publication of matter that is both defamatory and false.”).
Id. (also noting however that “[s]everal states have constitutional or statutory provisions” under which “truth of
a defamatory statement of fact is not a defense if the statement is published for ‘malicious motives’ or if it is not
published for ‘justifiable ends’ or on a matter of public concern”).
See generally id.
See generally id.

10

will ultimately need to establish that before the offending photo or video was posted onto the
Internet, the posting party edited the original content of the post. Without a showing that such
content was distorted, altered, etc., the unauthorized post cannot be considered defamatory
without being accompanied by some false caption, title, description, etc.72
B. Invasions of Privacy:
In some instances, a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting may be able to bring suit
alleging an invasion of his or her common law right to privacy. 73 Generally speaking, there are
four recognized common law privacy torts,74 three of which involve claims based on the public
disclosure of private information: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private
facts, and (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light.75 These three potential causes of
action are discussed individually below.76
1. Intrusion upon Seclusion:
The tort of unreasonable intrusion concerns invasions of a person’s interest in solitude or
seclusion.77 Generally speaking, to establish a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of “an intentional intrusion by the defendant;” (2) that
the intrusion was “into a matter which the plaintiff has a right to keep private;” and (3) that the

72
73
74

75
76

77

See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See Patricia Sanchez Abril, “A Simple, Human Measure of Privacy”: Public Disclosure of Private Facts in the
World of Tiger Woods, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 385, 389 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652A (1977).
BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.02[3][A].
See discussion infra Part.II.B.2. I have chosen not to discuss the substance and potential application of the
fourth recognized privacy tort - appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness – in this paper because
celebrities, which are not the focus of the paper, almost exclusively use this cause of action. See McClurg, supra
note 30, at 895 (acknowledging that while the right of publicity and appropriation claims are not reserved for
celebrities, they are commonly only used by celebrities).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977) (“The . . . invasion of privacy covered by
[intrusion upon seclusion] . . . consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or
seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive
to a reasonable man.”).
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intrusion was made “by the use of a method which is objectionable to the reasonable person.”78
Thus, whether an unreasonable intrusion claim can be sustained, depends on the particular
circumstances of the case, including whether the defendant acted intentionally, whether the
alleged conduct constitutes an intrusion, and whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the space allegedly intruded by the defendant.79
One context in which a plaintiff may have a viable claim for unreasonable intrusion is
where the alleged tortfeasor took photos or videos of the plaintiff – without the plaintiff’s
knowledge or consent - while the plaintiff was alone in their bedroom or bathroom.80 Courts
have routinely held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are alone
in these private areas.81 Thus, for example, if A installs a hidden video camera in B’s shower and
records B while she is taking a shower, A has intentionally intruded B’s privacy. Under these
facts, A may be subject to liability to B for tortuous intrusion, regardless of the content of the
videotape,82 and regardless of whether A later publishes the videotape.83 Instead, A’s potential
liability results from his act of recording of B, without her knowledge or consent, despite B’s

78
79
80

81
82

83

62A AM. JUR. 2D PRIVACY § 39 (2011) (citing cases).
See generally id.
See generally In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 2008) (finding that the respondent wife
“had a reasonable expectation that her activities in the bedroom of the home were private when she was alone in
that room”); State v. Perez, 779 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn. Ct. App.) (finding that the “[defendant]’s wife had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from being surreptitiously videotaped by him while she was alone in their
shared bathroom.”), review denied, A09-704, 2010 Minn. LEXIS 327 (Minn. June 15, 2010); Clayton v.
Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Tex. App. 2001) (“When a person goes into the privacy of the bedroom, he or
she has a right to the expectation of privacy in his or her seclusion.”).
See cases cited supra note 80.
See Tigges, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“The intentional, intrusive, and wrongful nature of [the defendant]'s conduct is
not excused by the fact that the surreptitious taping recorded no scurrilous or compromising behavior.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977); see also Tiggs, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“[The Plaintiff]
had no burden to prove the videotape was published to a third party without her consent.”); Clayton, 47 S.W.3d
at 156 (“The fact that no later exposure occurs does not negate that potential and permit willful intrusion by
such technological means into one's personal life in one's bedroom.”).
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reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances.84
Consequently, in the context of a Porn 2.0 victim, where the content of the unauthorized
posting was recorded without the victim’s knowledge or consent, the victim may have a viable
claim for unreasonable intrusion.85 A Porn 2.0 victim may also have a viable claim for
unreasonable intrusion where the alleged tortfeasor obtained the content of the posting through
the unauthorized access of the victim’s computer,86 or email.87 For example, in 2010, two
students at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey, Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei, were
charged with multiple counts of invasion of privacy for secretly placing a camera in another
student’s dormitory room and later transmitting the encounter on the Internet.88 The day after the
content was streamed over the Internet, the other student, Tyler Clementi, jumped to his death
from the George Washington Bridge.89 Wei has already entered into a plea deal that dropped the
two counts of invasion of privacy against her in exchange for her testimony against Ravi,
Clementi’s roommate and the person who allegedly set up the online video.90 However, a New
Jersey Superior Court Judge, Judge Glenn Berman, has already denied Ravi’s motion to dismiss
the charges in his indictment.91 Whether Ravi will be found guilty for invasion of privacy is still
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See Tiggs, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“The wrongfulness of the [defendant’s] conduct springs not from the specific
nature of the recorded activities, but instead from the fact that [the plaintiff]'s activities were recorded without
her knowledge and consent at a time and place and under circumstances in which she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
See supra notes 80, 82-84 and accompanying text.
See BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.02[3][B].
RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 174.
Press Release, Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, Two Rutgers students charged with invasion of privacy
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.co.middlesex.nj.us/prosecutor/PressRelease/ (follow “Two Rutgers students
charged with invasion of privacy” hyperlink).
Winnie Hu, Legal Debate Swirls Over Charges in a Student’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A15,
available at 2010 WLNR 19567582.
Henrick Karoliszyn & Larry McShane, Tyler Clementi's parents give woman accused of driving son to suicide a
break, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2011, at 10, available at 2011 WLNR 9105870.
Sue Epstein, Tyler Clementi suicide case: Defense attorneys appeal ruling that blocked review of personal
writings, THE STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 22, 2011, at 17, available at 2011 WLNR 24288511.
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to be determined and a trial date has been scheduled for February 2012. 92 In the mean time, an
appeals court has tentatively agreed to listen to arguments from Ravi’s attorneys as to why it
should overturn Judge Berman’s decision not to dismiss the indictment.93 If Ravi is ultimately
found guilty of invasion of Clementi’s privacy, however, the maximum sentence that could be
imposed is five years.94
Of course, whether the content of an unauthorized posting was recorded without the
victim’s knowledge or consent, and/or through the unauthorized access of the victim’s computer,
a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery is not premised on the fact that the posting party uploaded
certain content onto the Internet.95 Instead, whether a Porn 2.0 victim will be will be able to
sustain a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion ultimately depends on the circumstances
under which the alleged tortfeasor obtained the content of his or her posting.96 Nonetheless, since
a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery is generally limited, under the proper facts, a Porn 2.0
victim may utilize this theory to recover tort damages from the posting party.
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts:
On its face, the tort of public disclosure of private facts – which is implicated when
private and highly offensive information is publicly disclosed without authorization97 - is a
perfect cause of action to remedy a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting. 98 The public
disclosure tort requires: (1) a public disclosure, (2) that the facts disclosed were private, (3) that
the facts disclosed would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person, and (4)
92
93
94

95
96
97
98

Id.
Id.
Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 379, 383 (2011) (“The cyberbullies, Ravi and Wei, were both charged by the New Jersey District
Attorney's Office with invasion of privacy; however, under New Jersey law, ‘the most serious charges carry
[only] a maximum sentence of five years.’”).
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
See Abril, supra note 74, at 390.
See generally McClurg, supra note 30, at 887, 887-88, 897-99.
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that the facts disclosed were not of legitimate public concern.99 A victim of an unauthorized Porn
2.0 posting could more than likely establish the first three of these elements.100 Uploading
content onto the Internet would unquestionably constitute a public disclosure, and the sexual
nature of the content undoubtedly constitutes a set of private facts the disclosure of which would
be objectionable to a reasonable person.101
However, a Porn 2.0 victim may be unable to find relief in the public disclosure tort due
to the fourth element that a plaintiff must prove: the fact that the information disclosed was not
newsworthy or of public concern.102 The challenge that this fourth element presents is rooted in
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretations of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The First Amendment “generally bars the government from controlling the
communication of information (either by direct regulation or through the authorization of private
lawsuits), whether the communication is ‘fair’ or not.”103 Thus, if information about an
individual, albeit its private nature, is determined to be “in the public interest,” disclosure of such
information may not actionable, because the First Amendment grants the public the “right to
know” about such information.104
While the Supreme Court has never drawn a bright-line rule that a state can never punish
99

100
101

102

103

104

See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D. Ca. 1998). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that once such content has been uploaded onto the Internet, naturally the content is no longer
considered “private,” and thus any further postings of such content would not be actionable under the tort of
public disclosure. Compare Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 840-41 (holding that the plaintiff celebrity couple had a
right of privacy that extended to their sexual activities despite the fact that one of them was previously depicted
in a widely distributed sex-tape with a third-party to the action), with Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. CV96
7069SVW (JGX), 1997 WL 33384309, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (finding that the plaintiff celebrity
couple’s explicit photographs were no longer private facts because the same photographs had previously been
published).
See generally Abril, supra note 74, at 390; McClurg, supra note 30, at 888 (“In practice, however, this claim,
known as the tort of ‘public disclosure of private facts,’ offers only a slight chance of recovery by plaintiffs.”).
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of A Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (footnote omitted). See generally U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.05[4][B][i].
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truthful speech,105 the Court has adopted an extremely demanding standard for when a state can
punish truthful speech.106 The Supreme Court announced in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co.,107 and has since affirmed, that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”108 Courts have
struggled to apply this standard,109 and scholars have argued that in effect, the Court may have
left the public disclosure tort unconstitutional under the First Amendment.110
In sum, in the context of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, a victim may choose to bring
suit against the party who posted the unauthorized content under a theory that the posting party
publicly disclosed the victim’s private information. However, like any other plaintiff seeking to
bring a public disclosure claim, a Porn 2.0 victim will bear a heavy burden in light of the onerous
standard that the Supreme Court has announced in light of the First Amendment.111 However,
ultimately, it seems that non-celebrities explicit materials should not, and could not, qualify as
matters of public concern even under the Court’s Daily Mail standard.
3. Showing Plaintiff in a False Light
The tort of false light invasion of privacy protects a person’s interest “in not being made
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See Florida Star v. B.F.J., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (“Nor need we accept appellant’s invitation to hold broadly
that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”).
See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
See Abril, supra note 74, at 393 (“Subsequent courts have struggled with the contours of ‘public significance,’
‘public concern,’ and ‘newsworthiness,’ particularly in the context of celebrities. A judgment of the legitimacy
and social value of information is often circular, as it can be determined by the market's demand and curiosity
regarding the subject at hand.”).
See McClurg, supra note 30, at 888 (“Given the current state of the law, it is quite possible that the public
disclosure tort is ‘unconstitutional’ under the First Amendment.”).
See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
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to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or false position.”112 In order for the
publicity given to the plaintiff to be considered “objectionable,” the publicity must be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.113 Thus, a false light cause of action only arises “when the
defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable [person], would be justified in the eyes of the
community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the publicity.”114
In practice, there are four elements to a false light claim: (1) a false representation; (2) the
representation gave "publicity" to the allegedly false matter; (3) the matter disseminated has a
high degree of offensiveness; and (4) actual malice.115 Thus, as a threshold matter, in order for a
representation to be actionable under a theory of false light invasion, the representation must be
false.116 In the context of a Porn 2.0 victim, satisfying this threshold element may be challenging.
Like a Porn 2.0 victim who seeks to establish a claim of defamation, a victim seeking to establish
a false light invasion claim will need to prove that the content of the unauthorized posting was
altered or distorted (or that any text accompanying the content is false). However, at the same
time, a Porn 2.0 victim will only be able to recover under a false light theory if the victim can
prove that despite the falsity of the challenged posting, the public is aware that he or she is the
particular individual that is falsely depicted in the posting.117
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm:
Finally, when an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting is made to intentionally cause the non112
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433
U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 400 (1960)) (“‘The interest
protected’ in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light ‘is clearly that of reputation.’”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c (1977).
Id.
See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False light invasion of privacy -- cognizability and elements, 57
A.L.R.4TH 22, § 2[a] (1987).
See Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000); Levesque v. Doocy, 557 F. Supp. 2d 157,
164 (D. Me. 2008) (“Only statements that are provable as false are actionable under defamation or false light
invasion of privacy.”); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 53 (Alaska 2007) (“Because opinions cannot be proved
false, they cannot give rise to false light liability.”).
Donaldson, supra note 115, at § 22.
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consenting participant to suffer emotional distress, such distress may form a basis for the victim
to recover tort damages from the posting party.118 Generally speaking, an individual is subject to
tort liability for the severe emotional distress that they intentionally or recklessly cause to
another though their “extreme and outrageous conduct.”119 Thus, in order to establish a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the
defendant . . . acted intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences; (2) the
defendant's conduct . . . [was] extreme or outrageous; (3) [they] . . . suffered severe emotional
distress; and (4) the defendant's conduct . . . [was] the cause of such emotional distress.”120
Courts have only found liability for intentional infliction of emotional harm when the
alleged conduct “produces distress so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it, and which itself is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.”121 In the general context of the Internet, courts have found conduct amounting to
this demanding standard when plaintiffs have alleged “[v]arious types of online harassment . . .
including threats of violence, the publication of a victim's sensitive information, and disparaging
racial remarks.”122
In light of the popularity123 and the potentially severe consequences of Porn 2.0
websites,124 it is certainly plausible that that under the proper facts, a court may find that a

118

119
120

121

122
123
124

Note that in most jurisdictions, even if a victim’s severe emotional distress was not inflicted intentionally or
recklessly, the victim may be able to recovery for the negligent infliction of their emotional harm. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
Id. at § 46(1).
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claims for Vicarious and Individual Liability for Infliction of Emotional Distress
Derived from Use of Internet and Electronic Communications, 30 A.L.R.6TH 241, § 2 (2008).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
Citron, supra note 57, at 88 (citing cases).
See supra note 20.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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scorned co-worker or ex-lover who posts explicit photos or videos of another on the Internet, is
liable for the emotional distress they may cause as a result. However, whether a Porn 2.0 victim
suffers distress so severe as to make it actionable, will ultimately depend on the circumstances
surrounding the particular unauthorized posting including the outrageousness surrounding the
unauthorized posting.125
D. Conclusion:
A victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting may seek to recover tort damages from the
party who first posted the content on the Internet through traditional tort claims of defamation,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.126 However, a victim who
chooses to bring such claims will undoubtedly face various procedural and substantive
challenges including questions of the cognizability of a particular tort claim under state law,127
the potential inability to identify a primary tortfeasor who has posted anonymously, 128 and/or
demonstrating a heavy burden of proof.129
Even if a Porn 2.0 victim is ultimately successful in bringing a tort action against their
primary tortfeasor, the monetary amount of their recovery will likely be unable to compensate
the victim for the damages that they have sustained.130 Further, any recovery that a Porn 2.0
victim may receive from the posting party, will do nothing to remedy the root of plaintiff’s
damages: the unauthorized posting will still be available for anyone who logs onto the Internet to
see.
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See supra text accompanying note 121.
See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 3.
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III. POTENTIAL RECOVERY AGAINST INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
Theoretically, an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)131 is in a better position to remedy a
victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 positing than the party who originally posted the content on
the Internet. Generally speaking, advances in information technology have made it increasingly
cost effective for these intermediaries to monitor the activities of those who use their networks
more closely.132
When an individual discovers that he or she is the victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0
posting, understandably, one of the individual’s foremost concerns is the immediate removal of
the posting from the Internet. But notably, an ISP is capable of preventing, from the onset, the
distribution of the unauthorized content on a website that the ISP hosts. For example, when a
user uploads content for distribution through a Porn 2.0 website, the ISP for the site could simply
require verified consent from all participants in the photo/video before the content can be made
available for other users to see. However, if unauthorized content does end up on Porn 2.0 site,
the ISP who hosts the site can prevent the content from further dissemination on the Internet in
ways that the posting party cannot.133 For example, an ISP could refuse to send the packets of
information containing the unauthorized content, it could delete the content completely, or the
ISP could edit the photo or video (and any captions) so that the non-consenting participant is no
longer recognizable.134 Moreover, unlike an Internet user, an ISP can easily be identified and it
has the resources to pay money damages and thereby compensate Porn 2.0 victims for harm that
they have suffered as a result of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting.135
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For the remainder of this paper, I use the term “ISP” to broadly refer to those “interactive computer services”
that are potentially immune under § 230. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
Mann & Belzley, supra note 41, at 268.
Wu, supra note 45, at 107.
See id. at 107-08.
See id. at 108.
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However, in practice, once unauthorized materials are uploaded onto the Internet, there is
no legal mechanism by which a Porn 2.0 victim can require an ISP to take down the
unauthorized posting.136 Further, even if a Porn 2.0 victim does complain to an ISP about the
continued availability of an unauthorized posting, the ISP may still be shielded from any thirdparty liability under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).
Enacted in 1996, the CDA was passed to “promote the continued development of Internet
and other interactive computer services.”137 In order to effectuate this purpose, § 230 of the CDA
includes the following “Good Samaritan” provision: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”138 The CDA goes on to define the phrase “interactive
computer service” to mean “any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”139 Further, the phrase “information
content provider” is defined by the CDA as, “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”140 Thus, the language of § 230 draws an important distinction
between an ISP who merely publishes information provided by third parties and is therefore
protected by the Act’s provisions, and the party who actually creates or develops the same
information who is not protected by the Act.141
136
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138
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140
141

Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 11.
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(1) (West 2011).
Id. at § 230(c)(1).
Id. at § 230(f)(2).
Id. at § 230(f)(3).
MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, No. Civ.A.3:02 CV 2727 G, 2004 WL 833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
19, 2004).
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The protection provided to ISPs by § 230 however is not unlimited.142 Section 230(e)(1)
explicitly provides that “[n]othing in [§ 230] shall be construed to impair the enforcement of [47
U.S.C.S. §§ 223 or 231] (relating to obscenity) or [18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1460 et seq. or §§ 2251 et.
seq.] (relating to sexual exploitation of children) . . . , or any other Federal criminal statute.” 143
As a result, an ISP will not be protected by § 230 with respect to content distributed the ISP’s
services that is considered obscene and/or involves certain underage victims.144
Courts that have interpreted § 230 outside of the context of obscenity or child
pornography generally have done so broadly, finding that the section immunizes ISPs for any
harm caused by third-party content disseminated through the ISP’s service.145 For example,
§ 230 has been applied to “preempt claims for defamation, negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, negligent undertaking, intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment,
tortuous interference with contractual relations or business expectancy, breach of contract,
privacy and publicity claims, unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting, . . . strict product liability,
state consumer protection . . . and unfair competition laws,” to name only a few.146
The leading case in the construction of § 230 was Zeran v. American Online, Inc., where
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit broadly interpreted § 230 to immunize ISPs from
negligence claims premised on liability for a third-party’s acts of defamation.147 The plaintiff in
Zeran received multiple threatening phone calls in response to messages - posted on an
American Online (“AOL”) bulletin board – that advertised t-shirts mocking the Oklahoma City
142
143
144
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See CDA at § 230(e).
Id. at § 230(e)(1).
But see Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 558 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant MySpace was entitled to §
230 immunity and had no duty to implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators from
communicating with minors on its website).
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing cases); Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., No. Civ. 05-926-AA, 2005 WL 3005602, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2005), overruled by Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc.,
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
BALLON, supra note 32, at § 37.05[1][C] (footnotes omitted) (citing cases).
See Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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bombing and included the plaintiff’s name and contact information.148 Zeran alerted AOL on
multiple occasions that it was an anonymous third-party, and not he, who posted the offensive
messages.149 However, despite Zeran’s efforts, AOL did not immediately remove the posts, and
in accordance with the company’s policies, AOL refused to post a retraction.150 In response,
Zeran brought a negligence action against AOL, but the district court granted judgment for AOL
on the grounds that § 230 barred Zeran’s claims.151 On appeal, Zeran argued, among other
things, that § 230 did not shield AOL because the provider possessed actual notice of the
defamatory material that was posted through the use of the provider’s services.152 The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, reading the plain language of § 230 to create a “federal immunity” for service
providers with respect to “any cause of action that would make [them] liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.”153 Reasoning that this holding was consistent
with Congress’ intent in enacting § 230, the court stated: “Congress made a policy choice [], not
to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies
that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages.”154
In light of the Fourth Circuit’s broad holding in Zeran, and the plain language of § 230,
courts have repeatedly held that § 230 immunizes an ISP from simply hosting user-generated
content.155 However, the rationale announced in Zeran has also been applied by courts to
immunize ISPs from third-party liability. These are circumstances where an ISP went beyond
148
149
150
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Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330-31.
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419-20 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasoning that it was
irrelevant that “the ‘construct and operation’ of the [defendant’s Internet message board] might have some
influence on the content of the postings.”); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(reasoning that in “each instance raised by plaintiff’s tort claims, [defendant Internet search engine] either
archived, cached, or simply provided access to content that was created by a third party.”), aff'd, 242 F. App'x
833 (3d Cir. 2007).
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simply hosting third-party content.156 For example, courts have held that ISPs are immunized
where the ISP reposted third-party content onto other websites, even where the plaintiff alleged
that the ISP modified the content of the original posting.157 Similarly, courts have held that ISPs
are immunized where they merely exercise their editorial rights, which courts have found to
broadly include the rights to “make minor changes to the spelling, grammar and length of thirdparty content,”158 and the rights to “[D]ecide whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
[third-party] content.”159 Additionally, courts have held that ISPs are immunized under § 230
despite the fact that the service paid for, and even advertised, a third-party’s illegal content,160 or
despite the fact that the service failed to remove a third-party’s illegal content even after the
original author of such content expressly asked the service to remove the content.161
More recent court decisions have reexamined the scope of the protection provided by §
230. Several courts have held that ISPs are not protected by § 230 where they have intentionally
elicited illegal content from their users.162 For example, in Hy Cite Corp. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C, the district court found that the plaintiff’s allegations that the
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See infra text accompanying notes 157-61.
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the defendant website operator immunized
under § 230 where the plaintiff alleged the defendant re-posted a third-party’s allegedly defamatory email under
the reasoning that the defendant “did no more than select and make minor alterations” to the email); Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding the defendant website operator
immunized under § 230 even though the operator re-posted an allegedly false and unauthorized personal
advertisement about the plaintiff on other websites after making “slight” modifications to the ad).
See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1070, 1184 (9th Cir.
2008).
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 n.18 (citing Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50-51 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that defendant AOL was immune
under § 230 with respect to allegedly defamatory statements that were made by a third-party gossip columnist
with whom AOL had a license agreement where AOL had promoted the third-party to its subscribers and
potential subscribers as a specific reason to subscribe to AOL’s services).
See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008).
See Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (where an en banc court for the Ninth Circuit held that § 230 did not
immunize a website operator who “both elicit[ed] the allegedly illegal content and ma[de] aggressive use of it in
conducting its business.”); NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Supp. Jan.
26, 2009) (holding that the defendant website ticket reseller was not entitled to § 230 immunity with respect to
plaintiff’s tortious interference claim where there was evidence that the defendant contributed to illegal ticket
scalping by the site’s users).
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defendant website operator posted false and defamatory statements on its site, “arguably could
support a finding that [the] Defendants are responsible . . . for the creation or development of
information provided by [third-party users] in response to [the] Defendants’ solicitation.”163 One
Circuit court has found that an ISP was not protected by § 230 where the ISP specifically
promised to take down allegedly legal content.164 Additionally, even courts that have ultimately
held that § 230 applied to immunize an ISP under the present circumstances have cautioned, in
dicta, of the potential dangers from an overbroad reading of such protection.165 For example, in
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that despite case law to the contrary, “Subsection
(c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.”166
In the future, hopefully more courts will follow these courts’ lead in narrowing the scope
of § 230’s protection.

IV.

A TIME FOR CHANGE

Broad interpretations of § 230’s grant of protection may have been necessary at first.
Admittedly, one of the announced purposes of § 230’s protection is “to promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive services.”167 However, the Internet is no longer
in its initial stages of development,168 and nowhere in the language of § 230 did Congress use the
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Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005).
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that § 230 did not preclude the
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all-encompassing word “immunize.”169 Further, time has shown that individuals use the Internet,
including Porn 2.0, as a tool of embarrassment and revenge.170 Time has further shown that ISPs
use § 230 as a shield for their own ill motives.171 Yet despite this change in circumstances, the
actual language of § 230, and the realities of Porn 2.0 and § 230, courts have generally continued
to broadly construe § 230’s grant of protection and have provided ISPs with almost absolute
protection.172
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Zeran, the plain language of § 230 does not
provide ISPs with “immunity” with respect to liability for information originating with thirdparties. This sweeping protection is entirely the product of the courts. The plain language of §
230 protects ISPs with respect to third-party content, the creation and development of which the
service is not responsible for, in whole or in part.173 Further, § 230 protects those good faith ISPs
who voluntarily restrict access to, or the availability of, third-party content distributed through
their service.174 The language of the CDA certainly does not protect ISPs who, arguably in bad
faith, do not take affirmative action to remove third-party content when they have actual notice
that such content may be illegal. Thus, at the very least, Porn 2.0 victims should be able to find
relief in the form of a requirement that ISPs – who have actual notice from a victim of Porn 2.0 take affirmative steps to remove illegal and unauthorized content being distributed through their
service. Those ISPs who have received notice of illegal content on their site, should no longer be
shielded by courts’ overbroad interpretations of § 230.
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